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Abstract
We study the design of social long-term care (LTC) insurance when informal care is
exchange-based. Parents do not observe their children’s cost of providing care, which
is continuously distributed over some interval. They choose a rule specifying transfers
that are conditional on the level of informal care. Social LTC insurance is designed
to maximize a weighted sum of parents’ and children’s utility. The optimal uniform
public LTC insurance can fully cover the risk of dependence but parents continue to
bear the risk of having children with a high cost of providing care. A nonlinear policy
conditioning LTC benefits on transfers provides full insurance even for this risk. Informal
care increases with the children’s welfare weight.
Our theoretical analysis is completed by numerical solutions based on a calibrated
example. In the uniform case, public care should represent up to 40% of total care but
its share decreases to about 30% as the weight of children increases. In the nonlinear
case, public care increases with the children’s cost of providing care at a faster rate
when children’s weight in social welfare is higher. It represents 100% of total care for
the families with high-cost children.
JEL classification: H2, H5.
Keywords: Long-term care, informal care, strategic bequests, asymmetric information.
1 Introduction
Currently, informal care provided by family members represents a significant part of
long-term-care services. Since it is by definition informal its exact level is hard to
quantify but it is believed to be immense; see Bonsang and Schoenmaeckers (2015) and
Norton (2016, Section 3) for an overview of the relevant empirical studies. For instance,
Bolin et al. (2008) use SHARE (Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe)
data and find that elderly individuals with at least one child are likely to receive some
informal care.
Informal care has a number of attractive features. The family provides services
that are “warm”, and appear to be inexpensive. However, it also has deficiencies and
limitations, as its true costs, in particular, are often hidden. Caregiving can be extremely
costly for the caregivers, and the costs may be underestimated by parents. As Norton
(2016, page 961) puts it, “The economic cost of informal caregiving would be even
larger if the cost included the deleterious effects on caregivers’ health and labor market
outcomes.” This aspect is well documented in the medical literature.1 In the economic
literature, however, it has been neglected: exceptions are Colombo et al. (2011) or Coe
and Van Houtven (2009). For parents, the major shortcoming of informal care is that
its availability is subject to some randomness and asymmetric information. Fertility
cannot be fully controlled and the children’s type, that is, their cost of providing care
(or their degree of altruism), may not be known to parents at the time they make their
LTC arrangements.
Since private insurance markets for LTC are very thin, the shortcomings of informal
care create a potential role for a more coordinated and better designed public inter-
vention through social LTC provision or insurance. However, LTC policies are likely
to affect family transfers, and informal care, in particular. Consequently, policy design
must take into account its effects on exchanges within the family. These in turn depend
1For a survey, see Brodaty and Donking (2009). They point out that “The effects of being a family
caregiver, though sometimes positive, are generally negative, with high rates of burden and psychological
morbidity as well as social isolation, physical ill-health, and financial hardship,” and that “The high
levels of burden and psychological morbidity are well documented, as are factors that predict which
caregivers are vulnerable to these.”
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on the motivations of informal caregivers.
In a fairy tale world, informal care would be motivated by altruism. However, in
reality, other factors appear to be at work. Care may be “bought” through implicit
exchanges or be “imposed” by social norms. These three motives have been shown to
coexist and their relative importance to depend on the social and family context.2 In
this paper, we focus on exchange-based transfers. Informal care is compensated for
by monetary transfers, gifts or bequests.3 While the model does not explicitly take
altruism into account, altruism can have an impact on the children’s cost of providing
care. Specifically, we assume that children differ in their preferences, which may depend
on the degree of altruism, the strength of family bonds and many other factors, such as
the children’s exact working schedule, income and other commitments. These in turn
will affect their cost of providing care.
Canta et al. (2016) and Canta and Cremer (2020) also assume that children are
heterogeneous and that their type is unknown to parents ex ante. However, these
papers rule out transfers from parents to children, and informal care is exclusively
motivated by altruism. Parents cannot “buy” extra care through gifts or bequests.
The current paper, on the other hand, concentrates on families (or societies) where
children’s altruism is not sufficient, so that parents still need to “buy” extra care through
gifts or bequests. The relevance of the exchange-based provision of informal care has
been widely documented empirically. Cox and Rank (1992) using US data, show a
positive correlation between transfers from parents to children and both informal care
and children’s income, which supports the exchange motive. Light and McGarry (2004)
find both altruistic and exchange-motivated transfers in a survey of US mothers who
have left unequal bequests. In a Danish interview study, Lewinter (2003) documents the
importance of reciprocity (small gifts and hospitality) for both caregivers and dependent
parents. Ciani and Deiana (2018) also provide evidence of reciprocity in Italian data.
Alessie et al. (2014) and Tomini et al. (2016) use SHARE data and show that exchange
motives are important alongside altruism, and that the strength of altruism or exchange
2For a detailed survey of the empirical literature, see Arrondel and Masson (2006).
3See for instance Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Bernheim et al. (1985).
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motives depends on family and individual characteristics. More generally, studies based
on SHARE data (see for instance Klimaviciute et al., 2017) find a lot of variation in
terms of informal care motivations across Europe.
This paper is inspired by Canta and Cremer (2019), which we extend and generalize
by considering a continuous distribution of the children’s heterogeneity parameter rather
than a two-type model. From a theoretical perspective, this enables us to provide a much
richer analysis of both the parent’s and the government’s optimal policy. Specifically,
we can characterize the full profile of the induced informal care as a function of the
child’s cost of care. Even more importantly, the continuum model is better suited to
being tested empirically. We illustrate this by providing calibrated numerical examples
that show what proportion of total care should be provided publicly and how significant
its impact on social welfare is. The example also allows us to fully characterize the
nonlinear policy that implements the optimal allocation by relating public care to the
parents’ transfer.
We assume that parents can commit to a transfer, gift or bequest, conditional on the
level of informal care provided. While our results do not depend on whether the transfer
is a gift or a bequest, the use of gifts as payments is more relevant empirically. Children
who provide informal care have been shown to receive larger inter vivos transfers (Koh
and MacDonald, 2006; Norton and Van Houtven, 2006; Norton et al., 2013). In contrast,
bequests are usually divided equally among children (Menchik, 1980; Tomes, 1981). In
Europe, most countries impose equal sharing rules by law. Even in the US, where, in
principle, estates can be unequally shared, bequests tend to be divided equally even if
children provide unequal amounts of informal care (Norton and Taylor, 2005). 4
As in Canta and Cremer (2019), parents do not perfectly know their children’s
preferences, and their cost of providing informal care. Consequently, children may try
to overemphasize their costs in order to obtain a larger transfer and to extract a rent. In
this case, parents cannot absorb the full surplus generated by the intrafamily exchange.
Even when they can use nonlinear rules to screen for the children’s cost parameter, they
4Inter vivos transfers are also more appealing theoretically as payment of informal care. Gifts “can
be adjusted quickly to the amount of care, are less costly than writing a will, and can be kept secret
from other family members and the public.”(Norton and Van Houtven, 2006)
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must leave a positive rent to all of their children whose cost of providing care is lower
than the highest level. The care provided by children with costs above the minimum
level is therefore distorted downwards in order to mitigate the rent enjoyed by those
with lower costs.
Social LTC is designed to maximize a weighted sum of parents’ and children’s util-
ities. It thus explicitly takes into account the caregivers’ wellbeing, in contrast to the
existing literature, which has mostly concentrated on parents’ welfare. Since our focus
is on LTC policies and not on the more general issue of intergenerational redistribu-
tion, we assume throughout the paper that the government cannot redistribute between
parents and children using lump-sum taxes.5
We first characterize the optimal uniform social LTC policy, providing a given LTC
transfer to all dependent individuals. The transfer is financed by a uniform lump-sum
tax levied on parents. We show that this policy affects the levels of informal care as well
as the transfers to children. In other words, the distortions of informal care, and thus
the distribution of rents between parents and children, depend on the level of the public
LTC transfer. If the social planner only cares about parents, the risk of dependence is
fully insured. As the weight of children in the social welfare function (SWF) increases,
the insurance coverage of parents is adjusted in order to enhance the rent enjoyed by
the caregivers. The risk of having a high-cost child is never completely insured.
We then turn to the study of general policies. We assume that transfers from parents
to children are publicly observable and that LTC benefits can be conditioned on these
transfers.6 This general LTC policy can then screen for the children’s cost parameter,
even if the level of informal care is observable only to parents. Technically, we have
a “nested” principal-agent problem where the policy can screen for the children’s cost
of providing care, but only indirectly via the parents.7 Even if parents do not observe
their children’s cost of providing care, they have superior information since they observe
5Since we have a model with quasi-linear preferences, allowing for such taxes would yield corner
solutions, where the entire surplus would be given to the generation with the highest welfare weight.
6In practice, inter vivos gifts and bequests (estates) are already taxed albeit for different reasons
(Cremer and Pestieau, 2006).
7See Guesnerie and Laffont (1978) in the context of regulation and Tirole (1986) in the context of
hierarchies.
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informal care. We show that the general policy can provide full insurance to parents,
even against the risk of having high-cost children.
One surprising implication of our model is that the optimal level of informal care
increases as the children’s weight in the social welfare function increases. The explana-
tion for this result is that children receive a compensation that increases with the level
of informal care they provide. The policy, in order to increase the children’s rents, tends
to mitigate the downward distortion introduced by their parents.
Finally, we provide numerical solutions based on a calibrated example. We show
that in the uniform case and when market care is not available, public care should
represent about 40% of total care when the SWF includes only the parents’ utility. The
share of public care decreases to about 30% as the weight of children increases. In the
nonlinear case, public care increases with the children’s cost of providing care at a rate
that is larger, the larger the weight of children in social welfare. It represents the full
amount of total care for families with high-cost children when the weight of children in
the SWF is zero. These results are mirrored by the properties of the level of social care
as a function of the transfer that implements the optimal policy. Not surprisingly it is a
decreasing function, because parents with lower-cost children buy more informal care in
exchange for larger transfers (and thus “need”less social care). In our example, we also
find that this function decreases at a lower rate as the weight of children in the SWF
increases. Intuitively, if the social planner cares a lot about children’s wellbeing, social
care should not decrease too fast as intrafamily transfers increase, in order to ensure
that parents elicit (and pay) a large amount of informal care.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model. In Sections
3 and 4 we characterize the optimal uniform and nonlinear policy, respectively, while
section 5 presents the results of our calibrated example.
2 Model
We consider a generation of parents who are ex ante identical. When they are young,
they all receive an exogenous income wT and allocate it between consumption c and
savings s. When old, they are dependent with probability π and healthy with probability
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(1−π). We assume that their utility function is quasi-linear in young age consumption,
so that their expected utility can be written as
EU = wT − s+ (1− π)U (s) + πE [H (m)] ,
where E is the expectation operator, and m = s + a − τ(a) is consumption when old
and dependent. In case of severe dependence, one can think of m as consumption of
LTC services. In the case where parents are dependent, in addition to their savings,
they receive care from their children, a, in exchange for a transfer τ(a). In milder
cases m includes LTC, where both the care bought on the market and informal care are
expressed in monetary terms. The healthy elderly simply consume their savings. We
assume that U ′ > 0, H ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, H ′′ < 0, and that both functions satisfy the Inada
conditions. Furthermore, we assume that, for all x, U ′(x) < H ′(x). This ensures that
there is a role for insurance against the risk of dependence.
In line with the literature on strategic bequests, we allow the transfer rule to depend
on the level of informal care received from children, and we assume that parents can com-
mit to such a rule. However, in contrast to the traditional strategic transfer literature,
we assume that parents do not have full information on their children. Specifically, they
cannot observe the children’s cost of providing informal care, which is represented by a
parameter β. This parameter is determined by different factors affecting the provision
of informal care, such as the children’s degree of altruism or the children’s opportunity
cost of providing care. We assume that β is distributed over the interval [β, β] according
to the c.d.f. F (β).
When parents are healthy, children do not provide any care, and their utility is
normalized to zero. When parents are dependent, children’s utility is equal to
Uk = ck − v(a, β) ≥ 0, (1)
where children’s consumption ck = τ(a), that is the transfer from their parents, while
v(a, β) represents the cost of providing care, with va > 0, vβ < 0, vaa > 0, vaβ < 0.
In words, the cost of providing care is increasing and convex in the level of care. It
decreases in β, so that children displaying higher βs are the “good types” for whom
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providing care is less costly. Furthermore, the marginal cost of providing informal care
decreases when β increases.
The level of care chosen by a child of type β, a(β), is obtained by maximizing (1),
and is implicitly defined by
τ ′(a(β)) = va(a(β), β). (2)
The level of care depends on both the cost parameter and the bequest function τ(.).
Each parent has one child. Parents anticipate their children’s behavior, but do not
observe their cost parameter β. Their problem is then to maximize with respect to s
and τ(a) the following expected utility
EU = wT − s+ (1− π)U (s) + πEβ [H(s+ a(β)− τ(a(β))] .
We can rewrite this problem as a problem where parents choose s, a(β), and τ(β) to
maximize
EU = wT − s+ (1− π)U (s) + πEβ [H(s+ a(β)− τ(β)] ,
subject to the children’s participation and incentive constraints.
We will study the optimal public LTC insurance policy. The policy will consist of a
transfer to dependent parents financed through a lump-sum tax paid by parents when
young. The timing is as follows. The government commits to a policy in period 1. In
period 2, parents observe the LTC policy and commit to a transfer rule τ(a). Finally,
in period 3, children choose the level of informal care a according to (2).
When we consider nonlinear policies, the LTC transfer can be conditioned on the
bequest level τ , but not on the level of informal care, which is not publicly observable.
The optimal policy maximizes a weighted sum of parents’ and children’s welfare. The
weight of children in the social welfare function is equal to α ∈ [0, 1], and the weight of
parents is equal to (1− α).
We will first consider a uniform public LTC transfer, and then relax this assumption
and allow the public transfer to depend on bequests. In both cases, we first present
the benchmark case where there is no asymmetry of information between children and
parents, and characterize the corresponding LTC policy. We refer to this as “full infor-
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mation” for simplicity, but it must be emphasized that informal care is never publicly
observable. We then turn to the asymmetric information case.
3 Uniform LTC benefit
We first consider the case where the government uses a uniform LTC transfer. This case
can be relevant in practice since the government may be unable to observe bequests or
inter vivos gifts. In addition, uniform transfers may be used in practice for political
reasons since nonuniform policies may fail to gather sufficient political support; see for
instance Casamatta et al. (2000) or Cremer and Pestieau (2018). In the following
section, we will study a more sophisticated policy under which the LTC benefit can
be conditioned on the level of transfers, which will allow the government to screen
for different levels of β. In the remainder of this section, we first characterize the
optimal uniform policy when parents observe their children’s type. Whether or not
the government also observes β is irrelevant when we consider a uniform policy which,
by definition, cannot be conditioned on β. We then turn to the case with asymmetric
information between parents and children.
3.1 Full information benchmark
Assume first that the children’s cost parameter is observable both by the parents and
by the government. The problem of the parents is
max
s,τ(β),a(β) ∀β∈[β,β]




H(s+ a(β)− τ(β) + g))f(β)dβ
s.t. τ(β)− v(a(β), β) ≥ 0 ∀β ∈ [β, β], (3)
where (3) represents the children’s participation constraints. Under full information,
these constraints are all binding. If one of them were not, the parents could increase
their own utility by increasing a(β) or decreasing τ(β). Substituting for τ(β) from (3),
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this problem can be rewritten as
max
s,a(β) ∀β




H(s+ a(β)− v(a(β), β) + g))f(β)dβ.
The first-order conditions of the parents are
∂P f
∂a
= π[1− va(a, β)]H ′ = 0,
∂P f
∂s
= −1 + (1− π)U ′(s) + π
∫ β
β
H ′f(β)dβ = 0. (4)
Using the first condition, we can write
1 = va(a, β) ∀β ∈ [β, β]. (5)
Intuitively, with symmetric information, parents must reimburse their children exactly
the cost of the informal care they provide. This ensures that the children’s utility is
just equal to their reservation level. Under full information there is no reason to pay
more or, to use the terminology common in contract theory, to leave a rent to children.
Parents will then choose the level of care that equalizes the marginal benefit and the
marginal cost of informal care for each type β. In order to decentralize these levels of
care, (2) shows that it is sufficient for parents to set τ ′(a) = 1. It is also possible to
show that both a and m are increasing in β. Parents require higher levels of care and
enjoy a higher consumption when dependent if they have lower-cost children.
Turning to the policy design, we now consider the optimal uniform LTC benefit g
financed with a lump-sum payment πg paid by parents when young. When parents have
full information, no rent will be left to children, so that the problem of the government
can be simply written as
max
g




H(s+ a− v(a, β) + g)f(β)dβ,
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where s and a are the solutions to the parents’ problem for any given g. Note that
the children’s welfare weight α plays no role in this expression because their utility is
constant.
Using the envelope theorem, the first-order condition of the government is8
∂Gf
∂g
= −π + π
∫ β
β
H ′f(β)dβ = 0.




H ′f(β)dβ = 1,
implying that the marginal utility of consumption must be equalized across time and
dependence states. However, the uniform transfer g does not equalize consumption
across parents with different types of children. In other words, g cannot insure against
the risk of having high-cost children. It is interesting to note that the levels of a and τ
under full information do not depend on the level of g.
It is also important to note that, in this benchmark case, public insurance would not
be necessary if fair private LTC insurance were available. In that case, parents would
all choose ex ante a level of private insurance equal to g.
3.2 Asymmetric information
In this section we depart from the standard strategic bequest model and assume that
parents cannot observe the cost parameter of their children.
3.2.1 Parents’ problem
The parents’ problem is
max
s,τ(β),a(β) ∀β∈[β,β]




H(s+ a(β)− τ(β) + g)f(β)dβ (6)
s.t. τ(β)− v(a(β), β) ≥ τ(β̃)− v(a(β̃), β) ∀β, β̃ ∈ [β, β]
(7)
Uk(β) = τ(β)− v(a(β), β) ≥ 0 ∀β, (8)
8We assume that the second order condition holds.
10
where conditions (7) represent the incentive compatibility constraints, to ensure that
individuals cannot benefit from reporting a type β̃ different from their true type β, while
participation constraints are given by (8).
In Appendix A.1 we show that the set of incentive compatibility constraints in (7)
can be replaced by the local incentive compatibility constraint U̇k(β) = vβ(a(β), β),
and by the monotonicity constraint a′(β) ≥ 0. Intuitively, children must be prevented
from mimicking the type with the level of β “just below” theirs and, together with
the monotonicity condition, this ensures global incentive compatibility. A rent that is
increasing in β is then necessary to ensure that mimicking does not occur. With respect
to the full information case, the utility of children is now positive and depends on their
cost parameter. Furthermore, it may depend on the level of public insurance. In the





The parents’ problem can then be rewritten as9
max
s,a(β) ∀β∈[β,β]




H(s+ a(β)− Uk(β)− v(a(β), β) + g)f(β)dβ (10)




We show in Appendix A.2 that the optimal levels of informal care are given by the
following expression:






vaβ(a(β, )β) > 0 ∀β < β. (11)
This condition implies that a(β) is distorted downward with respect to its full-information
level defined in (5) for all β < β. This allows parents to reduce the rent enjoyed by
low-cost children. Equation (11) also implies that for all β < β, the optimal level of
care a(β) now depends on g through the distortion term.
9In the following, we assume that that a′(β) > 0.
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We now characterize the optimal linear LTC policy. Recall that under asymmetric
information between children and parents, children enjoy a rent, and their utility is
positive. Consequently, they may enter the social welfare function, and the respective
weights of parents and children will affect the optimal policy. The main trade-off in
setting this policy will be between parents’ insurance and children’s utility.
3.2.2 Optimal uniform policy
The government’s problem is given by
max
g









where a(β), Uk(β), and s are determined by the solution to the parents’ problem.
Using the envelope theorem, the first-order condition of the government is10
∂Gas
∂g














(1− F (β))vβ(a(β), β)dβ,














dβ = 0. (13)
Consequently, the sign of ∂a, /∂g will determine how the level of care affects the
caregivers’ utility, with this effect being represented by the second term of the expression.
Consider first the case where α = 0, so that children have no weight in the social




H ′f(β)dβ = 1.
10We assume that the second order condition holds.
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The optimal g is set according to the same rule as under full information. While this
ensures the same level of s, the levels of m will generally be different under asymmetric
information, and consequently the levels of the public LTC insurance benefit β. Use
superscripts f and as to refer to the solutions of the full information and asymmetric
information problem. When g = gf ,
∫ β
β H
′(mas(β))f(β)dβ > 1 , because mas(β) <
mf (β) (as a is distorted downward and children receive a positive rent). Consequently,
in the optimal asymmetric information allocation, gas > gf : the optimal level of LTC
benefits is larger under asymmetric information than under full information. Intuitively,
g is higher to compensate in part for the downward distortion in a.
When α > 0, children have some weight in the social welfare function. In this case,
the optimal LTC benefit is not only designed to provide insurance to parents. The
government also takes into account the impact of public LTC insurance on the rents
enjoyed by children. If ∂a/∂g > 0 increasing g to provide more insurance to parents
increases a, which also implies higher rents for children. If ∂a/∂g < 0, the two effects
go in opposite directions.
The sign of ∂a/∂g is then crucial to characterize the optimal LTC policy. In the
Appendix we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider the case where parents do not observe the children’s cost of pro-
viding care, and the government sets a uniform LTC benefit g financed through a lump-
sum payment by young parents. If the utility function in case of dependence, H dis-
plays DARA (decreasing absolute risk aversion), and the solution is interior we have
∂a/∂g < 0.
Intuitively, with DARA, as g increases, parents become less risk averse. Conse-
quently, distorting down informal care, and thus consumption in the bad state of nature,
is less costly for them.
Using the first-order condition of the parents with respect to s, (A.2), equation (13)
implies that, if α > 0 and H displays DARA





The utility of dependent parents is distorted down with respect to the full information
case under DARA. Providing full insurance against the risk of dependence would push
parents to cut the utility of low-cost children (by distorting down a). From the perspec-
tive of social welfare, there is then a tradeoff between insurance and children’s utility,
leading to less than full insurance. Accordingly, parents have an incentive to save more
and this increases their consumption if healthy.
Using equation (13) and Lemma 1 we can study the effect of α on gas(α). In the




In words, g decreases in the weight of children in the social welfare function. The
optimal uniform transfer as a function of the weight of children in the social welfare
function is represented in Figure 1. When α = 1, only the rent of the children enters in






Figure 1: Uniform LTC transfer under symmetric and asymmetric information
To sum up, g decreases in α, while for all β < β informal care a(β) (chosen by
parents) is decreasing in g.11 Consequently, a(β) increases in α, which is the children’s
weight in social welfare. This implies that the larger the weight of children in the social
11Parents’ choices do not directly depend on α.
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welfare function, the larger the optimal average level of informal care. This apparently
counter-intuitive result is due to the exchange motive behind informal care. Under
this motive, a higher reliance on the family for the provision of long-term care implies
higher rents for children. The optimal policy implies that children will provide more
informal care than in the laissez-faire, for which they will be compensated by higher
transfers. Family help under the optimal uniform LTC policy is represented in Figure
2. The distortion in a(β) in the asymmetric information is mitigated by the government
policy. The higher the weight of children in the social welfare function, the smaller the
distortion. However, no matter how large α is, the distortion in a(β) does not disappear.
To see this, recall that equation (11) implies that va(a(β, )β) is always strictly smaller







Figure 2: Family help as a function of β under symmetric and asymmetric information,
with α1 < α2.
The results obtained in this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider the case where the children’s cost of providing care is not
observable and where public policy is restricted to a uniform LTC benefit g financed by
a lump-sum tax. Informal care is observable only by parents. Assuming an interior
solution, the optimal LTC policy is such that:
(i) The risk of having children with a high cost of providing care is not fully insured;
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(ii) If children’s utility has no weight in social welfare, parents are fully insured
against dependence. This is achieved through a uniform benefit that is larger than in
the full information case;
(iii) If the weight of children in social welfare is strictly positive, and the parents’
utility in case of dependence H(m) exhibits DARA, parents are less than fully insured
against dependence. The uniform benefit decreases with the weight of children in social
welfare; and
(v) The average level of care provided by children increases with their weight in social
welfare.
Up to now, we have assumed an interior solution for both af and aas, however,
corner solutions are possible. Assuming that a is interior at least for the lowest-cost
children (β), two types of corner solutions may arise. First, we can have the case where
af is always interior but where aas = 0 for all β below some benchmark β0. Second,
we can have that both af and aas are zero for low β’s (high-cost children), where the
critical benchmark is smaller under full than under asymmetric information (due to the
downward distortion).12 The corner solutions are depicted in Figure 3.
4 Nonlinear policies
We now consider nonlinear policies where bequests are publicly observable and social
care g can be conditioned on the transfer, τ . The LTC policy can then screen for the
level of children’s cost parameter β. We continue to assume that a is observable only to
parents. The underlying problem presents methodological challenges because we have
to deal with a “nested” principal-agent problem.13 While the policy can screen for β
this is done only indirectly via the parents. These do not observe their child’s β either
but since they observe informal care, they have superior information.
12The first case occurs when va(0, β) < 1 ∀β and 1− va(0, β) + vaβ(0, β)
∫ β
β
H ′f(s)ds/H ′f(β) < 0 for
β < β0 < β. The second one arises when va(0, β) > 1 for β < β̂ < β.
13The problem considered by Guesnerie and Laffont (1978) has a similar structure. They analyze











Figure 3: Family help as a function of β under symmetric and asymmetric information,
corner solutions.
We proceed exactly like as in the previous section. We start with the full information
solution, then we consider the case where only parents have full information (about their
children). Finally, we turn to the most interesting case, where neither the parents nor
the government can observe the children’s type β. Parents observe a but the government
does not. The policy we study consists of a menu of LTC benefits and bequests. Under
asymmetric information parents self-select into a benefit-bequest pair. We continue to
assume that the government cannot make any direct transfer to children.
Observe that while we study a mechanism design problem, the policy can be im-
plemented by a suitably designed LTC and tax policy. How this can be done depends
on the precise timing and, more specifically, on whether τ is interpreted as a gift or a
bequest. When τ is a gift and thus precedes the public transfer g, the solution can be
implemented simply by a function g(τ) conditioning LTC benefits on τ . When τ is a
bequest, which by definition occurs after g is consumed, we can condition LTC on a
reported (planned) τ , but then we have to make sure that parents remain committed to
one contract in the menu (τ, g). In particular we have to prevent parents from leaving a
larger bequest than specified in the chosen contract (to “buy” more care). This can be
done by a nonlinear tax on transfers, which is prohibitively large when τ deviates from
that associated with the level of public care consumed. In practice, this means that
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“excess” public care can be recuperated from an individual’s bequest. In other words,
social LTC policy includes the possibility of so-called “estate recovery”; see Courbage
and Montoliu-Montes (2020).
4.1 Full information benchmark
Assume for the time being that both parents and the government have full information
and observe the cost parameter of children. The government sets a menu of contracts
(τ(β), g(β)). Parents will set a(β) such that τ(β) = v(α(β), β), which ensures the
participation constraint is just satisfied for all children, and choose s ex ante to maximize
their expected utility. Consequently, their behavior directly follows from the policy.
Under full information, the binding participation constraint continues to ensure that




Gfn =wT − π
∫ β
β




H(s+ a− v(a, β) + g(β))f(β)dβ,
where s and a are the solutions to the parents’ problem, and the superscript fn denotes
full information and nonlinear policies. Under full information, the levels of a and τ do
not depend on g(β) and are given by (5) and the children’s participation constraints.
Using the envelope theorem, the first-order condition of the government is 14
∂Gfn
∂g(β)
= −πf(β) + πH ′(s+ a− v(a, β) + g(β))f(β) = 0.
Combining this condition with (4) yields
U ′(s) = H ′(s+ a− v(a, β) + g(β)) = 1,
implying that the marginal utility of consumption must be equalized across time, depen-
dence states, and children’s types. The government is now able to equalize consumption
14We assume that the second order condition holds.
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across parents with different types of children which was never possible with a uni-
form policy. For the rest, with full information and unrestricted instruments it is not
surprising that that solution involves full insurance.
4.2 Asymmetric information
Consider now the case where neither the parents nor the government can observe the
children’s type. The government designs a schedule (g, τ). As in the full information
case, the parents’ behavior then directly follows from the policy. Specifically, the parents
set a schedule (a, τ), taking into account the government’s policy and the children’s
incentive and participation constraints. The children’s utility is then given by equation
(9).

























We assume that a′(β) > 0 holds, so that the second order condition for children’s
incentive compatibility is satisfied, and that the contract is separating.
We show in Appendix A.5 that the optimal levels of informal care satisfy the fol-
lowing condition:






This condition implies that a(β) is distorted with respect to the first best for all β < β.
The direction of the distortion depends on the weight of children in the social welfare
function. If α < 1/2, then informal care is distorted down. If α > 1/2, there is an
upward distortion. In this case, we may have a situation where the optimal contract
implies some pooling, as a′(β) > 0 may not hold. We rule out this possibility and focus
on separating contracts.
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As in the case of the uniform policy, under a nonlinear policy informal care also
increases as the weight of children in the social welfare function increases.
The optimal public LTC transfer is set in relation to the consumption of dependent
parents m(β) across children’s types. Imposing that m(β) = a(β) − τ(β) + g(β) is
constant implies that −a′(β) + τ ′(β) = g′(β). Since τ(β) = v(a(β), β) −
∫ β
β vβdx, then
g′(β) = −a′(β)+τ ′(β) = −(1−va)a′(β)+vaβ+vβ. Under our assumptions that vaβ < 0
and vβ < 0, and the incentive compatibility condition a
′(β) > 0, we have that g′ < 0
whenever 1− va > 0, which is always true if α < 1/2.
The results obtained in this section are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Consider the case where the children’s cost of providing care is not
observable and where the LTC benefit g, financed by a lump sum tax, can be conditioned
on the transfer τ . Informal care is observable only by parents. Assuming that the
schedule (a, τ) offered to children is separating, the optimal LTC policy is such that:
(i) The risk of having children with a high cost of providing care is fully insured;
(ii) If the weight of children in the social welfare function, α, is smaller than half,
then informal care is distorted down. If α is greater than half, then informal care is
distorted up; and
(iii) The average level of care provided by children increases with their weight in
social welfare.
5 Calibrated illustration
In this section, we simulate our model using a calibrated example.
5.1 Calibration
We assume that v(a, β) = a2/2β. Norton et al. (2013) estimate the elasticity of informal
care (expressed in hours per year) and financial transfers to children at 0.251. This would
correspond to aτ ′(a)/τ(a) in the notation of our model. Using the fact that, for the
latest year in their study, the average number of hours of informal care is equal to 395
and the average transfer (conditional on any transfer at all) is equal to 4,669 USD, we
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extrapolate an average τ ′(a) = 2.97. Solving the child’s problem, we have va = τ
′(a),
which for the average child reduces to 395/β = 2.97. This yields an average value of β of
133. Under the assumption that β is uniformly distributed over [0, β], such an average
implies that the upper bound of β is equal to 266.
We set the level of lifetime savings at 60,000 USD (see De Nardi et al., 2010, who
find that this was the 1996 median assets of individuals aged 74 in the US). We also
assume that dependence lasts for 5 years, but this is simply for the sake of illustration
and has no impact on the results.
To simplify the computations, we consider the following parents’ utility, which is
linear in a composite consumption good and concave in care









γ ln(a(β) + z(β) + g(β))
β
dβ,




2/2x2dx. Care is the sum of
informal care, a(β), formal care purchased on the market, z(β), and the care provided
by public insurance, g, which is flat under the uniform policy, and depends on β in the
nonlinear case. Formal care has a market price equal to p.
Integrating by parts the term containing τ(β), we obtain the following expression























γ ln(a(β) + z(β) + g(β))
β
dβ,
Consider first the case without any public insurance. For an interior solution, the



















We set the price of formal care p at 7.25 USD, which is the federal minimum wage
in the US in 2020. We focus here on formal home care, as opposed to nursing home
care. The former is often provided by low-skilled workers receiving a low compensation.
This implies that the optimal contract set up by the parents stipulates a(β) = 0.027β2.
Children with β = 0 should not provide any care, while children with the average cost
parameter (133) should deliver 477 hours of care per year (for comparison, the average
informal care documented by Norton et al., 2013, is 395 hours per year).
Concerning the level of formal care, we calibrate the parameter γ so that, on average,
formal care represents 13% of total care, or equivalently, 15% of informal care. This
corresponds to the share of formal home-care reported by Barczyk and Kredler (2018).15
For a family providing the average level of informal care (a = 395), this implies that
γ = 3, 975.
We have corner solutions such that z = 0 whenever a > 548 hours per year, which





− (β − β)a(β)
ββ2
= 0.







According to this expression, children with the lowest cost (β = β) should provide 1028
hours of informal care per year.
5.2 Uniform policy
With the specific utility function considered in this section, savings can be freely al-
located between formal care and other consumption. Formal care is chosen once β is
known while a uniform g is, by definition, the same in all states of nature. Consequently,
15Again, we focus on home care and we exclude individuals receiving nursing home care.
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it is plain that formal private care z dominates the uniform g. Consequently, under the
specification used in the calibration, when private formal care is available there is no
room for g.
To provide a more telling illustration of our analytical results we thus assume for
the remainder of this subsection that there is no private market for formal care so that
z = 0.
In this case, for all β, a(β, g) is defined as in (18). The highest cost children provide
no informal care, while the average level of informal care is 514 hours per year. The






















































Table 1 illustrates the uniform policy and the implied profile of informal care for
different values of α. If children are not included in the social welfare function (α = 0),
the optimal public LTC transfer is equal to 262, which corresponds to the level providing
full insurance against the risk of dependence. As the weight of children increases, the
public LTC transfer decreases, while the level of informal care for each β increases.
Public care crowds out informal care, which under the uniform policy is lower than the
laissez-faire informal care for all β.
Overall, the optimal share of public LTC in total care (evaluated for the average
parent) should range between 40% when α = 0 and 29% when α = 0.5. Social welfare
decreases in α in both the laissez faire and under the optimal uniform policy.16 More
16We mention this purely for the record because the underlying comparison is debatable. In any event
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LF α = 0 α = 0.10 α = 0.25 α = 0.40 α = 0.50
g 0 262 254 236 208 175
a(0) 0 0 0 0 0 0
a(50) 194 103 105 109 116 125
a(100) 387 278 281 287 297 309
a(133) 515 401 404 410 422 435
a(160) 619 502 506 513 525 538
a(266) 1,029 908 911 918 932 946
g/(g + a)|β=133 0% 40% 39% 37% 33% 29%
Social welfare in LF 21,606 19,546 16,454 13,362 11,301
Social welfare uniform policy 22,559 20,343 17,021 13,704 11,498
∆welfare uniform policy +4.4% +4.1% +3.4% +2.6% +1.7%
Table 1: Numerical illustrations of the uniform policy
interestingly, the welfare improvement obtained by means of the uniform policy over
the laissez-faire depends on the children’s weight in the social welfare function, α. The
higher this weight, the lower the welfare improvement (in percentage points) that can
be obtained by the uniform policy. Intuitively this reflects that fact that g is most
powerful when we care only about parents; when children enter the SWF the optimal g
results from a tradeoff because it decreases children’s utilities.
5.3 Nonlinear policy
With a nonlinear transfer, the Hamiltonian corresponding to the problem of the gov-
ernment, which in the general case is given in (A.8), can be rewritten as






−5πτ(β) + p(z(β) + g(β))
β
+ 5π












it is not a robust result because it depends on the relative scaling of parents’ and children’s utilities (of
which we take a weighted average) which is arbitrary. In particular, adding a sufficiently large constant
to children’s utility would reverse this property while not affecting the other results.
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The first-order condition with respect to informal care is now given by
γ






(β − β) a
β2
. (19)
Furthermore, the first-order condition of the government’s problem with respect to g(β)
is
γ
(a+ z + g)
= p. (20)
This is equivalent to the first-order condition of the parents with respect to z. Con-
sequently, g and z are redundant instruments, and to concentrate on g we assume in
remainder of the section that z = 0. Unlike in the uniform case considered in the pre-
vious subsection, g can now also be adjusted according to β so that g(β) and z(β) are




1−α (β − β) + β
=
7.25(1− α)β2
β(1− 2α) + αβ
. (21)





(β(1− 2α) + αβ)2
,
which is positive if and only if α ≤ 1/2. This is in line with the result obtained in the
analytical part where we have shown that for α > 1/2 the solution may involve pooling.
We shall continue to concentrate on this range of α’s. Simple inspection of (21) shows
that a(β) is positive as long as 1 − 2α > 0, while differentiating the expression shows
that a is strictly increasing in α for all types except the lowest-cost children.17
Table 2 illustrates the resulting informal care, transfers to children, and government
transfers for different levels of β (0, 50, 100, 133, 160 and 266). We find that the total
level of care is constant and equal to 548 hours per year, which is consistent with (20)18.
Informal care increases in β, as well as τ . Conversely, the government transfer decreases






β − 2βα+ αβ
)2 ,
which is strictly positive for all β < β.
18According to (20), total care is equal to γ/p = 3, 975/7.25 = 548.
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care (decreases with β) at a rate that is larger, the larger the weight of children in social
welfare. For high levels of β, we have corner solutions for g(β), such that g(β) = 0 for
all β > β̃, where β̃ is such that a(β̃) = γ/p. Since, for all β, a(β) is higher the higher
the weight of children in social welfare, the threshold β̃ decreases in α. In the corner
solutions, there is pooling in the level of informal care: a(β) = a(β̃) and τ(β) = τ(β̃)
for all β > β̃.
Under the optimal nonlinear policy, the share of public care on total care for the
average individual decreases with the weight of children in social welfare and should
range between 12% and 0%. Not surprisingly, social welfare is always higher than under
the uniform policy and yields higher welfare improvements with respect to the laissez
faire. The nonlinear policy allows us to target parents whose children have a high cost
of providing informal care, thus providing insurance against the risk associated with the
variance in informal care.
The optimal levels of informal care, transfers to children, and government transfers
are depicted in Figures 4-6 as a function of the cost parameter (for α = 0.25). In this
case the threshold β̃ (above which one has corner solutions) is equal to 129. As already
presented in Table 2, informal care and transfers to children increase in β, while the
optimal public transfer decreases in the cost parameter.
In Figure 7, we plotted the optimal level of the public LTC transfer as a function
of the level of intrafamily transfers τ , for different levels of α. As already illustrated in
Table 2, g(τ) is a decreasing function of τ . This function is steeper for lower levels of
α. Intuitively, the government needs to provide insurance for the parents. As a higher
τ is associate with higher levels of informal care, g decreases in τ . At the same time,
the government also wants to ensure that parents elicit (and pay) a sufficient amount
of informal care from their children. To this end, g should not decrease “too fast” in τ .
Since the latter government objective is more important for higher α, then the function
g(τ) is flatter when the weight of children in social welfare is higher.
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α = 0 α = 0.10 α = 0.25 α = 0.40 α = 0.50
a(0) 0 0 0 0 0
τ(0) 0 0 0 0 0
g(0) 548 548 548 548 548
a(50) 68 75 93 148 362
τ(50) 62 75 118 306 2,628
g(50) 480 473 455 400 186
a(100) 273 293 344 467 548
τ(100) 495 575 807 1,559 3,975
g(100) 276 255 204 81 0
a(133) 482 510 548 548 548
τ(133) 1,165 1,316 1,595 1,951 3,975
g(133) 66 38 0 0 0
a(160) 548 548 548 548 548
τ(160) 1,413 1,464 1,595 1,951 3,975
g(160) 0 0 0 0 0
a(266) 548 548 548 548 548
τ(266) 1,413 1,464 1,595 1,951 3,975
g(266) 0 0 0 0 0
β̃ 142 138 129 111 76
g/(g + a)|β=133 12% 7% 0% 0% 0%
Social welfare in LF 21,606 19,546 16,454 13,362 11,301
Social welfare nonlinear policy 22,643 20,420 17,096 13,811 11,756
∆welfare nonlinear policy +4.8% +4.5% +3.9% +3.4% +4.0%
Table 2: Numerical illustrations of the nonlinear policy
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Figure 4: Nonlinear policy: optimal levels of informal care, family transfer, and public
LTC transfers as a function of children’s cost parameter, for α = 0.25.
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Figure 5: Non-uniform policy implementation for α = 0, α = 0.25, and α = 0.5.
6 Summary and concluding comments
We have studied the design of social LTC insurance when informal care is exchange-
based. Parents do not observe their children’s cost of providing informal care but
they can commit to a rule specifying transfers that are conditional on the level of
informal care. Social LTC insurance is designed to maximize a weighted sum of parents’
and children’s utility. The optimal uniform public LTC insurance can insure the risk
of dependence but when children’s utility matters, parents are not fully insured. A
nonlinear policy conditioning LTC benefits on bequests provides full insurance, even
for the risk of having children with a high cost of providing care. Under the optimal
public policy, informal care always increases in the children’s welfare weight, irrespective
of the parents’ degree of risk aversion.
The numerical solutions based on a calibrated example illustrate the empirical im-
plication of our analysis. In the uniform case, public care should represent about 40%
of total care when SWF considers only the parents’ utility. The share of public care de-
creases to about 30 as the weight of children increase. In the nonlinear case, public care
increases with the children’s cost of providing care, at a rate that is larger, the larger
the weight of children in social welfare. It represents, on average, about one-tenth of
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total care when the weight of children in SWF is zero: it decreases with the weight of
children.
Our example is based on a very rough estimation of the distribution of the children’s
cost parameter, which must be followed up by a more sophisticated estimation of this
and other ingredients of our model. These limitations notwithstanding, this illustrates
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Appendix
A.1 Reformulation of Problem (6)–(8)
Incentive compatibility implies that, for each type β and β′,
τ(β)− v(a(β), β) ≥ τ(β′)− v(a(β′), β),
and
τ(β′)− v(a(β′), β′) ≥ τ(β)− v(a(β), β′).
Combining these two conditions yields
v(a(β), β′)− v(a(β), β) ≥ v(a(β′), β′)− v(a(β′), β),




vaβ(x, y)dydx ≥ 0.
Since vaβ < 0, this condition implies that, if β
′ ≥ β, a(β′) ≤ a(β). Then, incentive
compatibility implies that a′(β) ≥ 0.
The first-order condition for truth telling can be written
τ ′(β̃)− va(a(β̃), β)a′(β̃)|β̃=β = 0.
This equation implies that
U̇k(β) = vβ(a(β), β).
This first-order condition, together with a′(β) are necessary and sufficient conditions
for incentive compatibility (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
Since U̇k > 0, the only binding participation constraint is the one of the β type,
Uk(β) = 0. This condition, combined with U̇k(β) = vβ(a(β), β) yields Uk(β) = −
∫ β
β vβdx.
Consequently, the problem of the parents can be rewritten as (10).
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A.2 Derivation of Equation (11)
The Hamiltonian function associated with problem (10) is
H = wT − πg − s+ (1− π)U (s)
+ πH(s+ a(β)− Uk(β)− v(a(β), β) + g)f(β)− µ(β)vβ(a(β), β),
where µ(β) is the co-state variable. The first-order conditions are given by
∂H
∂a
= πH ′f(β)[1− va(a(β), β)]− µ(β)vaβ(a(β), β) = 0, (A.1)
∂H
∂s
= −1 + (1− π)U ′(s) + π
∫ β
β
H ′f(β)dβ = 0, (A.2)
∂H
∂Uk
= πH ′f(β) = −µ̇(β). (A.3)




πH ′f(s)ds < 0 ∀β < β (A.4)
Using (A.4), (A.1) can be rewritten as






vaβ(a(β, )β) > 0 ∀β < β.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Using (11) and applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain that the sign of ∂a/∂g






















The LHS of the inequality above represents the absolute degree of risk aversion. It is

































Consider the case where H(.) displays DARA. Then, −H ′′/H ′ decreases as β in-


















′f(s)ds increases in β, which is in con-











implying that ∂a/∂g < 0.
A.4 Variation of the uniform policy g with respect to α
Recall that a(β) and s are determined by the parents. Consequently they are not directly
affected by α, but depend indirectly on the weight via its impact on g. With this in


















where SOCg denotes the second derivative of the government’s problem with respect to
g. The expression above is always negative under DARA, since
∫ β
β H
′f(β)dβ > 1 and
∂a(β)/∂g < 0 for all β.
A.5 Derivation of Equation (15)
The Hamiltonian corresponding to Problem (14) is
37
H = (1− α)
[
wT − πg(β)f(β)− s+ (1− π)U (s)
]
+ π(1− α) [H(s+ a− v(a, β)− Uk(β) + g(β))f(β)]
+ απUk(β)f(β)− µβ[−vβ]. (A.8)
The first-order conditions are given by
∂H
∂a
= π(1− α)H ′f(β)[1− va(a(β), β)]− µ(β)vaβ(a(β), β) = 0, (A.9)
∂H
∂g
= −(1− α)[πf(β) + πH ′f(β)] = 0, (A.10)
∂H
∂Uk
= π(1− α)H ′f(β)− απf(β) = −µ̇(β). (A.11)
Condition (A.10) reduces to H ′ = 1 for all β. This implies that the consumption
of dependent parents m(β) = H−1(1) which does not depend on the children’s type.
This means that the risk of dependence is fully insured. Using this condition and the
transversality condition µ(β) = 0, equation (A.11) implies
µ(β) = −π(1− 2α)[1− F (β)].
Then, (A.9) can be rewritten as
1− va(a(β), β) = −
1− F (β)
f(β)
(1− 2α)
(1− α)
vaβ.
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